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Abstract
A challenging issue in modern choice theory is how to enrich the kind of data avail-
able to the researcher along with our understanding of the decision-making process.
We propose an axiomatic characterization of the ‘satisficing’ heuristic under various
informational structures. In particular we examine the cases in which search behavior
is both observable, partially observable, and unobservable. We also investigate behav-
ioral definitions of preference and satisfaction and establish uniqueness results. Finally,
we relate our framework to several well-known existing models.




The problem of choice is the basis of microeconomic theory. Standard models of
choice theory assume that a choice problem is composed of two elements: a family
P(X) of nonempty subsets of the grand set of alternatives X and a choice function
c : P(X) → X. The problem of choice entails picking one element from a budget set
A ∈ P(X) that is known in advance (Richter, 1966; Mas-Colell et al., 1995).
This framework has been criticized as unrealistic. According to Herbert Simon,
in most global models of rational choice, all alternatives are evaluated be-
fore a choice is made. In actual human decision-making, alternatives are
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often examined sequentially. We may, or may not, know the mechanism
that determines the order of procedure. When alternatives are examined
sequentially, we may regard the first satisfactory alternative that is evalu-
ated as such as the one actually selected. (Simon, 1955, 110)
We propose a model within the revealed preference approach in which the decision-
maker (DM) discovers and analyzes alternatives sequentially. In the real world there
are many circumstances in which alternatives are presented to the DM in form of a
sequence. For instance, alternatives may be disposed horizontally on some shelf and
the DM examines them from left to right. In this case there is a spatial constraint that
prevents the DM from perceiving all alternatives before deciding. Alternatively, the
DM may receive job offers sequentially in time. There are also circumstances in which
constraints are neither spatial nor temporal, but the DM examines alternatives sequen-
tially, because alternatives come to the DM’s mind according to some ordering. As
an example think of a person who has to decide where to spend her summer vacation.
Typically, an individual does not have in mind a complete set of potential destinations.
Rather, she discovers and analyzes new options by searching on the web and referring
to travel agencies while the decision process is taking place.
We assume that the DM behaves according to the satisficing heuristic (Simon,
1955). That is, she explores alternatives sequentially, stops searching as soon as she
identifies the first satisfactory alternative, and selects the best alternative among those
discovered. This choice is motivated by the fact that there is experimental evidence
consistent with the satisficing heuristic (Caplin et al., 2011; Reutskaja et al., 2011).
We investigate the conditions under which we can infer from choices whether or not
an alternative is revealed to be satisfactory (revealed satisfaction) and to be preferred
to some other alternative (revealed preference). A distinctive feature of our work is
that we explore these issues under various informational structures depending on what
variables are observable. Over the last decades, new devices have been developed in
experimental economics to enrich the data available to the analyst in order to gain a
deeper understanding of the mechanisms behind the decision-making process. How to
expand the informational structure along with our understanding of the model is key.
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Our work addresses this issue by considering three different choice domains.
We first assume that, for each choice problem, we can observe not only the budget
set and the choice made by the DM, but also search order. In this case we provide
behavioral definitions of both satisfaction and preference, show that our procedure is
equivalent to two simple properties of choice, and illustrate that our model includes
standard maximization as a special case.
Under the second domain, we assume that search order is just partially observable.
In this case we provide behavioral definitions of satisfaction and preference and ax-
iomatically characterize our procedure by using slightly modified versions of the two
properties mentioned above.
Finally, we assume that search order is unobservable. Under this domain we show
that we can recover satisfaction and preference, but only over unsatisfactory alterna-
tives. In addition we demonstrate that in this case our model is a special case of the
standard maximization procedure and provide a short discussion of our results.
The model is related to the literature on attention and consideration set (Manzini
and Mariotti, 2007; Masatlioglu et al., 2009; Eliaz and Spiegler, 2011; Eliaz et al.,
2011). The closest studies to our work are Rubinstein and Salant (2006), Tyson (2008),
Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2009), Horan (2010), Caplin and Dean (2011), and Ray-
mond (2011). We discuss them in turn.
Rubinstein and Salant (2006) develop a model called choice from lists in which
the DM chooses either the first or the last maximal alternative from any list depending
on its positioning in the list. In the same spirit, Horan (2010) investigates several
sequential search models including the satisficing one by utilizing the choice from lists
framework. In contrast, we propose a model in which the DM does not necessarily
examine alternatives one by one. More precisely, we consider both the standard case
in which the DM examines all alternatives simultaneously, the polar case in which
alternatives are examined one by one, and all the cases in between.
Tyson (2008) investigates a particular aspect of the concept of ‘satisficing’ by
proposing a model in which the DM does not fully perceive her preferences and this
bias increases in the complexity of the choice problem. He shows that, when complex-
ity it is aligned with set inclusion (nestedness of preferences), then his choice proce-
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dure is equivalent to Sen (1971)’s β property.1 In contrast, we focus on another aspect
of the satisficing theory by assuming that the DM discovers and analyzes alternatives
sequentially.
Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2009) propose a model called choice by iterative search
in which the DM starts by analyzing an exogenously given contemplation point, con-
siders only those alternatives that are similar to it and, by means of an iterative search
process, stops searching as soon as the contemplation point is the best available alterna-
tive in the consideration set. In contrast, we assume that the search process terminates
as soon as the first satisfactory alternative is identified.
Caplin and Dean (2011) propose a reservation-based search decision strategy by
formalizing the concept of choice process data. That is, the DM picks the best alter-
native among the ones she has already explored at any given point in time and stops
searching as soon as she identifies the first alternative that yields at least the reservation
utility, given that searching is costly. Unlike Caplin and Dean (2011), we do not make
use of choice process data, but consider only final choices and assume that search order
is observable or partially observable. We also investigate the case in which search order
is unobservable as Caplin and Dean (2011) do, but the two models still differ because
unlike them we assume that the choice correspondence records the choices made by
the DM under multiple menu sequences.
Raymond (2011) characterizes a broad set of search models, including classical
model of sequential search, by assuming that observable data are given by preferences
over lists of outcomes. In contrast, we focus on the satisficing model and assume that
observable data are choices from within menu sequences.
In addition, in a section below we formally relate our work to the following mod-
els: choice from lists (Rubinstein and Salant, 2006), choice with frames (Salant and
Rubinstein, 2008), agenda rationalizability (Apesteguia and Ballester, 2010), choice
by iterative search (Masatlioglu and Nakajima, 2009), and choice with initial endow-
ments (Masatlioglu and Ok, 2009).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the formal model. Section
1Property β: given two alternatives x, y ∈ A ⊆ B, if x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ C(B), then x ∈ C(B).
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3 discusses the first informational case by providing motivations and examples, inves-
tigates behavioral definitions of satisfaction and preference, and provides an axiomatic
characterization of our model (along with uniqueness results) under the first choice
domain. Section 4 and Section 5 do the same job under the second and the third do-
main, respectively. Section 6 investigates the relationships with other models. Section
7 concludes.
2. The Model
Let X be a finite grand set of alternatives and P(X) the set of all non-empty subsets
of X. Each element A of P(X) is a budget set. We call menu sequence the sequence
with which the DM examine alternatives and formally define it as follows.
Definition 1. A menu sequence A of the budget set A ∈ P(X) is a sequence A ≡
〈A1, . . . , ANA〉 such that A j ⊂ Ak ⊂ A, for all k > j and ANA = A.
We call each element A j of the menu sequence A stage of the menu sequence A.
We assume that the DM can investigate all the alternatives within a stage without any
additional cost. In this study we will consider various choice domains depending on
how what variables are observable. We first consider the domain D1, according to
which we assume that we can observe not only the choice made by the DM and the
budget set, but also the entire menu sequence.
Imagine a consumer that receives a sequence of e-mails containing various deals on
some product (e.g. phone and broadband). At each stage of the process, the consumer
compares multiple offers and decides whether to either purchase one of the available
products or wait for further options to come. Another example is a stockbroker that
every day has to decide how to invest considerable sums of money on the behalf of the
investors. It is reasonable to expect that during the day she will have to repeatedly make
quick decisions, such as whether to either (i) buy x shares, or (ii) sell y bonds, or (iii)
buy x shares and sell y bonds, or (iv) do nothing and wait. Given the high time pressure
within financial markets, in order to maximize the value of the investors’ portfolios
the stockbroker is somehow forced to compare multiple alternatives simultaneously.
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Other examples of menu sequences are all circumstances in which objects appear in
sequential packages, physical spaces, and web-pages.2
Formally, let D1 ⊆ ⋃A∈P(X) Σ(A), where Σ(A) is the set of menu sequences for
A ∈ P(X). At the end of next section we will specify what data (menu sequences with
relative choices) we need to observe in order to obtain our results. We call extended
choice function the choice function defined on D1. We assume that c(A) ∈ A is non-
empty and single-valued.
Let  be a strict linear order on the set X representing DM’s preferences.3 Let
xs ∈ X be a distinguished alternative such that all alternatives to which xs is -preferred
are considered to be unsatisfactory. Let UC(A; xs) ≡ {x ∈ A|¬(xs  x)} be the upper-
contour set of xs according to , representing the set of satisfactory alternatives avail-
able in the set A. Let max(A;) ≡ {x ∈ A|@y ∈ A s.t. y  x} be the set of maximal
alternatives according to the relation  in the set A.
Definition 2. c is a Satisficing Choice Function (SCF) if and only if there exist a strict
linear order  on X and a distinguished alternative xs ∈ X such that, for any A =
〈A j〉 ∈ D1,
{c(A)} ≡ max(Γ(A);)
where Γ(A) ⊆ A is a a consideration set mapping
Γ(A) ≡
 A js if UC(A; x
s) , ∅
A otherwise
and js ≡ min{ j|A j ∩ UC(A; xs) , ∅}.
2The above examples fit within the concept of menu sequence, but do not within the Rubinstein and
Salant (2006)’s list one.
3A binary relation  is irreflexive whenever (x, x) <. Given x, y, z ∈ X, a binary relation  is transitive,
whenever (x, y) ∈ and (y, z) ∈ imply that (x, z) ∈. Given x, y ∈ X such that x , y, a binary relation  is
complete whenever either (x, y) ∈ or (y, x) ∈. Given x, y ∈ X, a binary relation  is asymmetric whenever
(x, y) ∈ implies that (y, x) <. A strict linear order is a transitive, asymmetric, irreflexive, and complete
binary relation.
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The primitive element of our model is the pair (, xs), which fully characterizes
the DM. Our interpretation is that the DM has in mind a preference relation  and a
distinguished alternative xs and judges satisfactory those alternatives that are at least as
good as xs and unsatisfactory those that are worse than xs. The DM searches through
the budget set A according the menu sequence A and if she identifies at least one
satisfactory alternative in the first stage, then she stops searching at A1, which becomes
the consideration set, and selects the -maximal alternative available in A1. Otherwise,
she explores the second stage and the procedure is the same as before. If there is
no satisfactory alternative in the budget set A (i.e., UC(A; xs) = ∅), then she keeps
searching until she discovers the whole budget set. In this case she selects the best
unsatisfactory element from A. Notice that this procedure is not demanding in terms
of memory as it requires the DM to keep in mind just one alternative (the best one) at
each stage of the process. For this reason, we believe that it is reasonable to assume
that the DM chooses the best unsatisfactory alternative available once she has explored
the whole budget set.
3. Fully Observable Menu Sequences
Over the last decades various data enrichment techniques have been developed in
experimental economics to shed light on the process that leads a DM to make a deci-
sion. The mouselab technology, for instance, allows for monitoring which attributes
have been looked up in multi-attribute and multi-alternative decision problems. The
more sophisticated eye-tracking device records eye-movement images and allows the
experimenter to infer subject’s information acquisition patterns. Search behavior can
be observed and recorded outside the laboratory too. In online purchases, for instance,
firms can easily infer which products have been examined before the transaction is
completed by looking at the links that the consumer has explored. Another example is
the stores in which consumers are forced to follow a given path between the shelves
from the entrance to the exit and there are shortcuts for those consumers who stop
searching before completing the tour (e.g. IKEA). The choice domain D1, defined in
section 2, aims to capture all those situations in which search order is observable.
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Suppose that we observe the DM making choices. Our first concern is to provide
a behavioral definition of satisfaction (xs). Assume that c is an SCF. How can we tell
whether an alternative is satisfactory or not? Consider a menu sequence 〈{x}, X〉 ∈
D1. Since a satisficing DM always stops searching as soon as she identifies the first
satisfactory alternative, then x being satisfactory implies that the DM must choose
x from 〈{x}, X〉. To see that this condition is also sufficient for x to be satisfactory,
assume, by contradiction, that x is chosen from 〈{x}, X〉 and x is unsatisfactory. This
implies that the DM considers all alternatives in the grand set and x is the -maximal
alternative. However, since there is at least one satisfactory alternative in the grand set,
then x has to be satisfactory, which contradicts our previous assumption.
Proposition 1 (D1-Revealed Satisfaction). Assume that the choice function c is an
SCF. Then, x ∈ UC(X; xs) if and only if x = c(〈{x}, X〉). Whenever this occurs we say
that x isD1-revealed to be satisfactory.
Notice that if {xs} = max(X;), then c is rationalizable by a strict linear order. That
is, if the aspiration level that partitions the grand set into satisfactory and unsatisfactory
alternatives is the best alternative in X, then the DM behaves as if she was a maximizer.
We are also interested in investigating whether, given two alternatives x, y ∈ X,
x is revealed to be preferred to y or vice versa. Assume that x = c(A) and y ∈ A.
This information is not enough for ensuring that x  y. To see why, assume that y is
preferred to x, x = c(A), and y ∈ A. This does not lead to a contradiction, because
the DM might have stopped searching before exploring y and chosen x. Therefore, in
order to identify the revealed preference, we first need to define behavioral attention.
Let x ∈ A and define m(x,A) ≡ min{ j|x ∈ A j} to be the first stage of the menu
sequence A to which x belongs. Assume the DM chooses some alternative y from A
and we are instersted in verifying whether she considers x ∈ A. If x = y, then obviously
she considers x. Next, assume that x , y and that x ∈ Am(c(A),A). Then, once again we
can conclude that the DM considers x. The reason is that since y is chosen, then it must
be that all alternatives that precede y in the sequence (or are discovered at the same
time as y) are considered. Finally, assume that x < Am(c(A),A). This implies that the
chosen alternative y precedes x at the menu sequence A. The only way in which the
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DM can explore x is that the chosen alternative y is not a satisfactory alternative. We
already know, by proposition 1, that this occurs whenever y , c(〈{y}, X〉). Whenever
one of these three cases occur we say that x attracts attention at A.
Proposition 2 (D1-Revealed Attention). Suppose that c is an SCF and x ∈ A. Then,
x ∈ Γ(A) if and only if one of the following cases occur.
1. x ∈ Am(c(A),A) or
2. y = c(A) and y , c(〈{y}, X〉).
Whenever this occurs we say that x attracts attention at A.
Given x, y ∈ X, we will have that x is revealed to be preferred to y whenever x is
chosen, y is available, and y attracts attention.
Proposition 3 (D1-Revealed Preference). Suppose that the choice function c is an
SCF. Then, x  y if and only if there is some A ∈ D1 such that x = c(A) and y attracts
attention at A. Whenever this occurs we say that x isD1-revealed to be preferred to y.
We now move to the axiomatic characterization. We propose two properties.
Limited Consideration WARP (LCWARP). Assume that x and y attract attention
at A and B and x , y. Then, if x = c(A), then y , c(B).
Standard WARP requires that given two alternatives x, y ∈ A ∩ B, if x = c(A),
then y , c(B) without distinguishing between alternatives that the DM considers and
alternatives that she does not. LCWARP is a weakening of WARP and requires the
extended choice function to satisfy WARP, provided that the DM pays attention to x
and y at both choice problems according to the definition provided in proposition 2.4
4Masatlioglu et al. (2009) introduce an axiom called ‘WARP with Limited Attention’. The difference
between Limited Consideration WARP and WARP with Limited Attention is in the definition of ‘paying
attention to’. Masatlioglu et al. (2009) define a set to be a consideration set whenever the removal of one
alternative that the DM does not consider does not change the consideration set. On the contrary, in this
paper the consideration set is defined according to the definition of proposition 2.
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Satisficing (SAT). If x = c(〈{x}, X〉), then x < Am(c(A),A)−1 for all A ∈ D1 such that
x ∈ A.
SAT requires that if an alternative is revealed to be satisfactory, then it cannot be
the case that the DM discovers x and then explores further the menu sequence. In other
words, if x is acceptable, then it cannot happen that the DM discovers and chooses
an alternative y at some stage of the menu sequence, given that at an earlier stage she
explored x.
Theorem 1. An extended choice function c is an SCF if and only if c satisfies LCWARP
and SAT.5
Given a pair (, xs), let c(,xs) be the SCF induced by (, xs).
Proposition 4 (Uniqueness). Let c be an extended choice function on D1. Given two
pairs (, xs) and (′, xs′), if (, xs) , (′, xs′), then c(,xs) , c(′,xs′).6
The results of this subsection allow us to infer non-parametrically whether DM’s
behavior is consistent with the satisficing procedure simply by testing LCWARP and
SAT. In addition, by using propositions 1 and 2 we can infer both satisfaction and
preference. In order for our results to hold we need to observe the choices made from
following three sets of menu sequences:
1. every A such that A1 = A and |A| ≤ 3, 7
2. every 〈{x}, X〉 for any x ∈ X,8 and
3. every A such that |A1| = 2 and |A| = 3.9
If the grand set contained three alternatives, this would mean that we would need
to observe just ten out of twenty-two possible menu sequences.
5Proofs of the theorem and independence of the axioms are given in the appendix.
6The result follows from propositions 1 and 3.
7These observations are needed to construct the strict linear order  and to infer revealed preference.
8These observations are needed to infer satisfaction.
9These observations are needed in theorem 1 to prove that alternatives that are revealed to be satisfactory
are preferred over those unsatisfactory.
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We conclude this section by noting that if, on the one hand, the assumption that
search order is observable might sound demanding in some circumstances, then, on
the other hand, it is also true that under this assumption relatively few observations
are needed in order to obtain the above results. Moreover, as proposition 4 suggests,
preferences and aspiration level can be uniquely identified.
4. Partially Observable Menu Sequences
In this section we assume that for each decision problem we observe the feasible
set, the choice made by the DM, and the starting point from which the search process
begins. The starting point can be either a single alternative or a menu of alternatives.
We can interpret the starting point as a default option or menu, as past consumption,
as a social norm or convention, or as a focal point. Imagine a consumer who examines
the products displayed on a supermarket shelf. The observable starting point could be
the set of items placed at the head of the shelf that the consumer necessarily considers.
Those items are very likely to attract attention, because they are placed in a strategic
position, they are often advertised and sometimes discounted. Another example could
be the ‘menu of the day’ in a restaurant. Costumers typically first examine the dishes
in the menu of the day and then eventually look at the paper-menu.
In order to capture this kind of situations we introduce the domainD2 ⊆ {(A1, A)|A1 ⊆
A ∈ P(X)}. We interpret (A1, A) as a choice problem, where A is a budget set and A1
is the first (observable) stage of the menu sequence. The remaining stages (if any) are
assumed to be unobservable. Let c be the extended choice function defined onD2.10
Definition 3. c is a Satisficing Choice Function defined on D2 (SCF2) if and only if
there exist a strict linear order  on X and a distinguished alternative xs ∈ X such that,
for any (A1, A) ∈ D2,
{c(A1, A)} ≡ max(Γ(A1,A);)
10We assume that c(A1, A) ∈ A is non-empty and single-valued. At the end of this section we will specify
what data we need to observe in order to get our results.
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where Γ(A1,A) ⊆ A is a a consideration set mapping
Γ(A1,A) ≡

A1 if UC(A1; xs) , ∅
A¯ if UC(A \ A1; xs) , ∅ = UC(A1; xs)
A otherwise
and A¯ is any set such that A1 ⊂ A¯ ⊆ A.
Our interpretation of the SCF2 is analogous to the SCF’s. The only difference is
that if the budget set A contains some satisfactory alternatives and these alternatives are
not in A1, then the consideration set is given by A¯, where A¯ is some subset of A such
that A1 ⊂ A¯ ⊆ A.
Now we move to the behavioral definitions of satisfaction and preference. The
definitions of revealed satisfaction and preference are analogous to the ones of previous
section.
Proposition 5 (D2-Revealed Satisfaction). Suppose that c is an SCF2. Then, x ∈
UC(X; xs) if and only if x = c({x}, X). Whenever this occurs we say that x is D2-
revealed to be satisfactory.
Proposition 6 (D2-Revealed Preference). Suppose that the choice function c is an
SCF2. Then, x  y if and only if there is some (A1, A) ∈ D2 such that x = c(A1, A) and
y ∈ A1. Whenever this occurs we say that x isD2-revealed to be preferred to y.
Now we move to the axiomatic characterization. We propose two properties that
are analogous to the ones illustrated in the previous section: Limited Consideration
WARP and SAT underD2 (LCWARP2 and SAT2, respectively).
LCWARP2 differs from LCWARP in the conditions under which we impose stan-
dard WARP to hold. Consider the following definition.
Definition 4. Let x ∈ A. We say that x matters at (A1, A) whenever one of the following
cases occur.
1. x ∈ A1 or x = c(A1, A).
2. y = c(A1, A) and y , c({y}, X).
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3. y = c(A1, A) < A1 and there is no (C1,C) ∈ D2 such that y ∈ C1 and x = c(C1,C).
Here is our interpretation. It is clear that under the domainD2 we can infer attention
only partially, because search order is just partially observable. In particular we can
infer that x is part of the DM’s consideration set only if two cases occur. First, either
x belongs to the first stage of the menu sequence or x is chosen (case 1 of definition
4). Second, the chosen alternative is revealed to be unsatisfactory and therefore the
DM considers all alternatives in the budget set, including x (case 2). However, these
conditions are not necessary for x to be part of the DM’s consideration set, because
it can happen that the chosen alternative y is satisfactory, x, y < A1, and x ∈ A¯. In
this case x is part of the consideration set. However, since A¯ is unobservable, then it
is impossible to infer whether this occurs or not. Nevertheless, we can say something
about in-attention in this case. Assume that the chosen alternative y is satisfactory and
x, y < A1. Notice that if x is revealed to be preferred to y, then it cannot be that x
attracts attention at (A1, A). The reason is that if this was the case, then the DM would
have chosen x instead of y. Therefore, a necessary condition for x to attract attention
at (A1, A) is that the chosen alternative y has to be revealed to be preferred to x (case
3). However, this condition is not sufficient, because it might still be x does not attract
attention at (A1, A).
LCWARP2. Assume that x and y matter at (A1, A) and (B1, B). Then, if x =
c(A1, A), then y , c(B1, B).
On the other hand, SAT2 is a straightforward reformulation of SAT under the do-
mainD2.
SAT2. If x = c({x}, X), then c(A1, A) ∈ A1 for any (A1, A) ∈ D2 such that x ∈ A1.
Theorem 2. An extended choice function c is an SCF2 if and only if c satisfies LCWARP2
and SAT2.11
11Since LCWARP and SAT are independent, then it is easy to figure out that also LCWARP2 and SAT2
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Given a pair (, xs), let c(,xs) be the SCF2 induced by (, xs).
Proposition 7 (Uniqueness). Let c be an extended choice function on D2. Given two
pairs (, xs) and (′, xs′), if (, xs) , (′, xs′), then c(,xs) , c(′,xs′).12
In order for our results to hold we need to observe the choices made from the
following problems:
1. every (A1, A) such that A1 = A and |A| ≤ 3,13
2. every ({x}, X) for any x ∈ X,14 and
3. every (A1, A) such that |A1| = 2 and |A| = 3.15
If the grand set X contained 3 alternatives, then we would need ten out of sixteen
possible observations.
Interestingly by observing search order just partially, we are still able to character-
ize the proposed procedure and uniquely identify satisfaction and preference. The only
sacrifices are that we can only partially infer attention and the proportion of needed
data under D2 is greater than under D1. The latter suggests that in relative terms it
is more useful to a policy-maker to have few detailed observations (D1) than many
coarser ones (D2).
5. Unobservable Menu Sequences
In this section we assume, as in standard revealed preference theory, that search
behavior is not observable. That is, we can observe just the feasible set of alternatives
and the choice made by the DM. Imagine a consumer who searches for some product
in a marketplace. In this case inferring her search behavior appears a rather difficult
task. The reason is that there are many entries to the marketplace and consumers can
do. The proof of the theorem is given in the appendix.
12The result follows from propositions 5 and 6.
13These observations are needed to construct the strict linear order  and to infer revealed preference.
14These observations are needed to infer satisfaction.
15These observations are needed in theorem 2 to prove that alternatives that are revealed to be satisfactory
are preferred over those unsatisfactory.
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freely move from one stand to the other. Another example is those circumstances in
which alternatives are available to the DM, but consideration, comparison, and analysis
of the various options mainly take place in the DM’s mind (e.g. chess).
Formally, let D3 ⊆ P(X).16 Let C(A) ⊆ A be a choice correspondence defined
on D3. We define C to be an Induced Satisficing Choice Correspondence whenever C
records the choices made by the DM who follows the satisficing procedure under mul-
tiple menu sequences. Under this domain we assume that we can repeatedly observe
the DM making choices.
Definition 5. C is an Induced Satisficing Choice Correspondence (ISCC) whenever
there exists an SCF c such that, for any A ∈ D3,
C(A) ≡ {x ∈ A|x = c(A) for some menu sequence A ∈ Σ(A)}
We first investigate the conditions under which we can unambiguously state that
an alternative is satisfactory. Notice that if an alternative x is acceptable, then, by
proposition 1, x is chosen from the menu sequence 〈{x}, X〉. If C is an ISCC, then this
implies that x ∈ C(X). In the other direction if x ∈ C(X), then it must be that x = c(X)
for some X ∈ Σ(X) implying that x is satisfactory.
Proposition 8 (D3-Revealed Satisfaction). Suppose that C is an ISCC. Then, x ∈
UC(X; xs) if and only if x ∈ C(X). Whenever this occurs we say that x isD3-revealed
to be satisfactory.
Assume that x ∈ C(X). Let A ⊆ X and 〈{x}, . . . , A〉 ∈ D1 be a menu sequence. Since
x ∈ C(X), then, by proposition 8, x is satisfactory and, therefore, x = c(〈{x}, . . . , A〉).
Assuming that C is an ISCC, this implies that x ∈ C(A). In other words, a satisfactory
alternative is always chosen whenever available. This implies that, under this domain,
we cannot infer what is the ranking between satisfactory alternatives. On the contrary,
we can recover the preference relation over unsatisfactory alternatives. Assume that
A = {x, y} and x, y are unsatisfactory. Independently of the menu sequence the DM
16At the end of this section we will specify what data we need for our results to hold.
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pays attention to both alternatives. Therefore, if she prefers x to y, then x = c(A)
for any A. This implies that {x} = C(A). On the contrary, if she prefers y to x, then
{y} = C(A).
Proposition 9 (D3-Revealed Preference). Let C be an ISCC and x, y < UC(X; xs) .
Then, x  y if and only if there is some A ∈ P(X) such that {x} = C(A) and y ∈ A.
Whenever this occurs we say that x isD3-revealed to be preferred to y.
Now we move to the axiomatic characterization.
We propose two properties. The first one is the well-known Weak Axiom of Re-
vealed Preference.
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). Given x, y ∈ A ∩ B, if x ∈ C(A)
and y ∈ C(B), then x ∈ C(B).
The second one is called Maximal Indifference and requires that if an alternative x
is jointly chosen with another alternative y, then x has to be chosen from the grand set.
Maximal Indifference (MI). If x, y ∈ C(A), then x ∈ C(X).
Here is our interpretation. Assume that a satisficing DM is confronted with a bud-
get set A. If there is no satisfactory alternative in A, then independently of the menu
sequence, she will always choose the same alternative, say x. This implies that the
induced choice correspondence is a singleton {x} = C(A). Hence, for C(A) not to be a
singleton, it must be that there are at least two satisfactory alternatives in A. Assume
that x, y ∈ C(A). By the above argument, this implies that both x and y are acceptable
alternatives. MI simply requires that since x, y ∈ C(A) reveals that x is satisfactory,
then x has to be chosen from the grand set X. Too see why this axiom is reasonable,
assume that it is violated. That is, x is revealed to be satisfactory and is not chosen
from the grand set X. Since x < C(X), then this implies that there is no menu se-
quence X such that x = c(X). This sounds to be an implausible conclusion as we know
that a satisficing DM always stops searching as soon as she identifies the first accept-
able alternative and there are menu sequences inD1 such that x is the first satisfactory
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alternative available.17
Theorem 3. C is an ISCC if and only if it satisfies WARP and MI.18
Given a pair (, xs), let C(,xs) be the ISCC induced by (, xs). Next, let unsat⊆
be the preference relation  restricted to unsatisfactory alternatives only.
As far as uniqueness is concerned, notice that given two pairs (, xs) and (′, xs′),
(, xs) , (′, xs′) implies that C(,xs) , C(′,xs′) if and only if either xs , xs′ or
unsat,′unsat or both. The reason is that under the domain D3 we can infer prefer-
ence only below the aspiration level. This implies that the identification process is
unique only under the above conditions.
In order for our results to hold we need to observe the choices made from the
following budget sets.
1. every A such that |A| ≤ 3,19 and
2. the grand set X.20
In addition, we need that whenever an alternative x is revealed to be satisfactory,
then the DM chooses from a menu sequence B that lists x before any other satisfactory
alternative in B for any B ∈ D3 such that x ∈ B and |UC(B; xs)| > 1. We come back
to this assumption in a paragraph below. Let X = {x, y, z} and assume that x and y are
satisfactory. Then, we need four out of four possible observations, which are c({x, y}),
c({x, z}), c({y, z}), and c(X), and that the DM explores first x (resp., y) and then y (resp.,
x) at both X and {x, y}.
We draw several conclusions from these results. First, by assuming that search or-
der is unobservable, we are still able to infer satisfaction and preference but only below
the threshold. Moreover, we need to make minimal assumptions about what are the
menu sequences that the DM is required to choose from. However, on the other hand,
the proportion of needed data is higher than under the first two informational cases
17E.g. all menu sequences such that 〈{x}, . . .〉.
18Proofs of the theorem and independence of the axioms are given in the appendix.
19These observations are needed to infer preference.
20This observation is needed to infer satisfaction.
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suggesting that there is a tradeoff going on: on the one hand, observing more variables
allows for recovering more information about the DM and relative less observations
are needed. On the other hand, observing less variables implies a limited inference of
the DM’s characteristics and relatively more observations are needed.
Second, standard WARP is often violated in the real world. However, we propose
a characterization, which is a special case of the standard model. Indeed, C is not
rationalizable by any weak order, but only by the weak order that admits indifference
only among maximal alternatives. A similar result is established by Rubinstein and
Salant (2006). The intuition behind our result is that in order for theorem 3 to hold we
need to assume that the satisficing DM chooses from some key menu sequences. If this
assumption holds, then the induced choice correspondence is more than rational for the
following reason. First, if a budget set A does not contain any satisfactory alternative
(or just one), then the DM always chooses the same alternative independently of the
menu sequence. Second, if A contains more than one satisfactory element, then there is
always a menu sequence that lists a satisfactory alternative before any other satisfactory
alternative implying that the DM chooses it. This implies in turn that the induced choice
correspondence will include all satisfactory alternatives available in A for any A and
place them at the top of the ranking. On the other hand, without the above assumption,
the choice correspondence induced by an SCF may be very irrational. Assume that
x ∈ C(A), y ∈ C(B), and x, y ∈ A ∩ B. This choice pattern implies that x and y are
satisfactory. If the DM does not choose from a menu sequence B that lists x before
y, then we will never observe x ∈ C(B). Hence, we would not be able to show that
C satisfies WARP. The conclusion is that there might be satisficing DMs that violate
WARP out there. A reason for which we observe violations may be because they do
not choose from some key menu sequences.
Third, it is easy to see that if we define the induced choice correspondence as
CP(A) ≡ {x ∈ A|x = c(A1, A) for some A1 ⊆ A} with c being an SCF2, we get ex-
actly the same results. The reason is that under the domain D3 by assuming that C
is an ISCC we can infer satisfaction and preference over unsatisfactory alternatives.
Since this information can be recovered also under the domain D2, then, by defining
the induced choice correspondence as a CP, we do not sacrifice anything.
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6. Relationships with Other Models
6.1. Choice from Lists
Rubinstein and Salant (2006) propose a model in which the DM chooses from lists
of alternatives. Formally, given any two stages A j, A j+1 of a menu sequence A, A is
defined to be linear whenever |A j| = |A j+1|−1 for all j = 1, . . . ,NA−1. LetDL ⊂ D1 be
the domainD1, where all menu sequences inD1 are linear. A Rubinstein and Salant’s
list is a linear menu sequence.
Rubinstein and Salant (2006) characterize the set of choice functions that maxi-
mize some preference relation, where indifference is resolved according to the position
that alternatives take up in the lists: either the first or the last maximal alternative is
selected. Formally, let = ∪ ∼ be a weak order on X and let δ : X → {1, 2} be
a priority indicator, where  and ∼ denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of ,
respectively.21 Let δ(x) = δ(y) whenever x ∼ y. Given any list A ∈ DL, let D,δ be a
choice function that chooses from A either the first or the last -maximal element of
the list A depending on whether the δ-value of the -maximal set is 1 or 2, respectively.
Proposition 10. Let c be an extended choice function defined on DL. If c is an SCF,
then it is also a D,δ, but the converse is not true.
We omit the proof of this proposition as in the appendix we generalize Rubinstein
and Salant (2006)’s model to menu sequences and then show that our model is a special
case of theirs by providing an intuition of our results.
The procedure proposed by Rubinstein and Salant (2006) encompasses a more gen-
eral class of models than ours. Nevertheless, there are several aspects of our model that
makes it complementary to theirs.
First, we generalize lists to menu sequences. That is, we do not assume that the
DM necessarily examines alternatives one by one. As we largely discussed in section
2, there are many real world examples that fit within our model, but do not within
theirs.
21A weak order is a complete and transitive binary relation. Let ≡ {(x, y) ∈ X×X|(x, y) ∈ and (y, x) <}
be its asymmetric and ∼≡ {(x, y) ∈ X × X|(x, y) ∈ and (y, x) ∈} its symmetric part.
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Second, unlike Rubinstein and Salant (2006), our model allows for inferring prefer-
ences above the threshold xs. To see why their model does not, notice that a satisficing
DM always stops searching as soon as she identifies the first satisfactory alternative.
Since according to Rubinstein and Salant (2006)’s domain the DM examines alterna-
tives one by one, then it is impossible to infer the ranking between satisfactory alterna-
tives.
6.2. Choice with Frames
Salant and Rubinstein (2008) propose a framework called choice with frames ac-
cording to which the choice function depends not only on the budget set, but also on
some observable information, called frame, which is irrelevant from a standard view-
point. Formally, a choice problem with frames is a pair (A, f ), where A ∈ P(X) is a
budget set and f ∈ F is a frame in the set of frames. The first two versions of our model
(SCF and SCF2) can also be defined in terms of choices with frames. We first examine
the SCF.
Let O be a weak ordering on X, representing an ordering with which the DM exam-
ines alternatives. We identify the choice function with frames c(A,O) with the extended
choice function c(O|A), where O|A is the menu sequence induced by restricting the or-
der O to a budget set A. An SCF, which we denote by cS CF(O|A), can then be defined
as:
cS CF(O|A) ≡ max(A;O)
where O depends on the frame O and is constructed as follows.
O≡ ( \{(x, y) ∈ |x, y ∈ UC(X; xs)})
∪{(x, y) ∈ |x, y ∈ UC(X; xs) s.t. xOy and (¬(yOx) or x  y)}
Each O modifies the ranking between satisfactory alternatives depending on what
is the positioning that alternatives take up in the ordering O. Given a frame O and
two satisfactory alternatives x and y, if x strictly O-precedes y, then independently of
whether x  y or y  x we have that x O y. The reason is that, under the frame O, the
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DM always discovers x before discovering y. Since both x and y are satisfactory, then
the DM always stops searching as soon as she discovers x and chooses it. On the other
hand, if x O-precedes y (weakly) and x  y, then O coincides with . Finally, notice
that the ranking between unsatisfactory alternatives is not affected.
This definition suggests that any cS CF(O|A) satisfies WARP. In Salant and Rubin-
stein (2008)’s terms we would say that cS CF(O|A) is an example of a salient considera-
tion function.22 Interestingly, this implies that violations of WARP can take place only
when the DM mixes two or more frames O. Since the proposed model does not place
any restriction on the way in which the DM discovers alternatives, then it is straightfor-
ward that an SCF can explain a variety of irrational choice patterns, such as cycles.23
Nevertheless, it is not true that the SCF can explain any choice pattern.24
Now we move to analysis of the SCF2. It turns out that the SCF2 is not a salient
consideration function. Too see why, notice that, given a problem (A1, A) ∈ D2 and
fixing the ‘frame’ A1, an SCF2 admits the choice reversal phenomenon. Let z,w be
two unsatisfactory and x, y two satisfactory alternatives. Suppose that alternatives are
disposed on a circular shelf (see figure 1) and that the DM’ starting point is the singleton
{z}.
Assume for the moment that product w is unavailable and that the DM decides
to explore the alternatives clockwise. In this case she discovers x, which is the first
satisfactory alternative available, and, therefore, stops searching, and chooses it. Next,
assume that w becomes now available and the DM decides to explore the alternatives
anti-clockwise. In this case, she first discover w, an unsatisfactory alternative, and
continues her search process until she reaches y. Since y is satisfactory, then she stops
searching and selects it. In sum, x = c({z}, {x, y, z}) and y = c({z}, {x, y, z,w}), which is
22An extended choice function c is a Salient Consideration function if for every frame f ∈ F, there exists a
corresponding ordering  f such that c(A, f ) is the  f - maximal element in A (Salant and Rubinstein, 2008).
23Let 〈{x}, {x, y}〉, 〈{y}, {y, z}〉, 〈{z}, {x, z}〉 ∈ D1 and assume that x, y, z are satisfactory. Then, x =
c(〈{x}, {x, y}〉), y = c(〈{x}, {x, y}〉), and z = c(〈{x}, {x, y}〉), which is clearly a cyclical choice pattern.
24Assume that x ∈ UC(X; xs). Let 〈{x}, . . .〉 ∈ D1 be a menu sequence. Since x is satisfactory, then the
DM must stop searching at the first stage and choose x. Therefore, any c that does not select x from 〈{x}, . . .〉






Figure 1: A circular shelf.
not compatible with the definition of salient consideration function.
6.3. Agenda Rationalizability
Apesteguia and Ballester (2010) propose a model in which the alternatives in X are
ordered according to some linear order <. Let T be a tournament and let A> be a list
induced by ordering the alternatives in A ⊆ X according to <.25 Given any list A<, the
DM compares the first two alternatives in the list and selects the winner according to
T . Then she compares the selected item with the third alternative in the list and again
selects the winner according to T . The DM proceeds in this way until she compares the
surviving alternative with the last element of the list. The winner of this last comparison
constitutes the final choice c(A<). Let e(T,A<) denote the chosen alternative from a
list A< according to the above procedure and whenever e(T,A<) = c(A<) we say that c
is agenda rationalizable.
Proposition 11. If c is an SCF, then it is agenda rationalizable, but the converse is not
true.
In the agenda model the DM examines always alternatives according to <. As we
know from the previous section, if a satisficing DM explores alternatives according to
the same ordering, then an SCF is rationalizable by a strict linear order. This implies
that an SCF is agenda rationalizable. However, the converse is not true, because a
25A tournament is an asymmetric and complete binary relation.
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tournament might generate cyclical choice patterns that are not consistent with the
definition of SCF.
6.4. Choice by Iterative Search
Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2009) propose a choice procedure, called choice by
iterative search (CIS), in which the DM starts by exploring an exogenously given con-
templation point and considers only those alternatives that are similar to it. If the
contemplation point is the best alternative in the consideration set, then the DM stops
searching and chooses it. Otherwise, she keeps searching, the best alternative avail-
able becomes the new contemplation point, and the procedure is the same as before.
This process continues until the the contemplation point is the best alternative in the
consideration set. Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2009) define their model on the do-
main DS P ⊆ {({x}, A)|A ∈ P(X) and x ∈ A}. Details of the Masatlioglu and Nakajima
(2009)’s model and proof can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 12. Let c be an extended choice function defined onDS P. If c is an SCF2,
then it is also a CIS, but the converse is not true.
The intuition behind this result can be figured out by looking at the CIS revealed
preference relation. Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2009) argue that x is revealed to be
preferred to y whenever they observe either (i) x = c({y}, A) or (ii) x = c({z}, A) and
z = c({y}, B). That is, (i) x is chosen when y is the starting point or (ii) x is indirectly
revealed to be preferred to y. Notice that if c was an SCF2, then we would reach exactly
the same conclusion. However, in our model there are other circumstances in which
we can conclude that x is preferred over y. Suppose, for instance, that x = c({z}, A),
y ∈ A, and z , c({z}, X). This choice pattern reveals that since z is unsatisfactory, then
all alternatives in A are considered by the DM, x is the most preferred alternative in A,
and, therefore, x is preferred to y. Notice that in the CIS model this does not apply.
In sum, under the domain DS P, the satisficing revealed preference relation (strictly)
includes the CIS one.
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6.5. Choice with Initial Endowments
Masatlioglu and Ok (2009) propose a model of choice in which the DM deals with
choice problems both with and without initial endowment. In particular, if she faces
choice problems without an initial endowment, she chooses by maximizing some utility
function U, as in the standard model. On the other hand, whenever she deals with
choice problems with an initial endowment, she follows a two-stage procedure. In the
first stage, she restricts her attention to a subset of the available alternatives. This set
includes all elements that are superior to the initial endowment in an unambiguous
sense. If x ∈ X is an initial endowment, then we denote this set by Q(x), where x ∈
Q(x). Then, in the second stage, she chooses from the restricted set by maximizing her
utility function. That is, given a budget set A and an initial endowment x ∈ A, the DM
chooses arg maxy∈A∩Q(x) U(y).26
In our framework each ({x}, A) ∈ DS P can be thought as a choice problem with an
initial endowment.
Proposition 13. Let c be an extended choice function defined on DS P. If c is a choice
with initial endowments, then it is not necessarily an SCF2 and also the converse is
true.
We prove this by means of two examples. Consider first the following scenario:
x = c({y}, A), y = c({w}, B), and x ∈ B. This choice pattern clearly violates LCWARP2.
The reason is that x = c({y}, A) reveals that x  y and y is unsatisfactory. Since
y = c({w}, B), then the DM considers all alternatives in B (including x) revealing that
y  x, a contradiction. However, this choice pattern is compatible with a choice with
initial endowments. To see why, notice that in reference-dependent preference models,
such as Masatlioglu and Ok (2009), preferences change with respect to the reference
point. Therefore, in the previous example it might be case that x ∈ Q(y), but x < Q(w).
That is, x is unambiguously better than y, when y is the starting point, but does not
26See also Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) and Apesteguia and Ballester (2009) as other studies that investigate
status-quo biased and reference-dependent behavior.
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clearly dominate w, when w is the initial endowment. Therefore, x = c({y}, A) and
y = c({w}, B) with x being available are not contradictory.
In the other direction, assume that x = c({z}, A), y = c({z}, B), x = c({x}, X), y =
c({y}, X), and x, y ∈ B ⊂ A. Notice first that this choice pattern is rationalizable by
an SCF2. Let x ∈ Γ({z},A), y ∈ Γ({z},B), y < Γ({z},A), and x < Γ({z},B). That is, assume
that the DM pays attention to x at ({z}, A) and to y at ({z}, B) and does not consider
y at ({z}, A) and x at ({z}, B). This assumption is feasible, because x = c({x}, X) and
y = c({y}, X) reveal that both x and y are satisfactory. Hence, the satisficing DM simply
chooses the maximal alternative from the consideration set, which is x at ({z}, A) and y
at ({z}, B). On the other hand, this choice pattern is not compatible with a choice with
initial endowments. The reason is that since x = c({z}, A), then this implies that x is
unambiguously better than z, when z is the reference point. Since, y = c({z}, B), then the
same applies to y. However, since x, y ∈ B ⊂ A, then we infer that {x, y} ⊆ Q(z)∩A∩B.
Given that the DM chooses the alternative with the highest utility from the sets Q(z)∩A
and Q(z)∩ B, then x = c({z}, A) and y = c({z}, B) imply that x yields more utility than y
and y yields more utility than x, respectively, which is clearly a contradiction.
7. Concluding Remarks
This paper proposes a theory of boundedly rational choice within the revealed pref-
erence approach in which DM’s behavior is consistent with the satisficing heuristic.
Our main contribution is that we investigate behavioral definitions of satisfaction
and preference and axiomatically characterize the proposed model under three different
choice domains. This allows us to figure out the extent to which by expanding the
informational structure we can gain a deeper understanding of the proposed model. We
have found that the revealed information is monotonic. That is, the more detailed the
observations, the more we can infer about the DM’s behavior. However, at the same
time, as observations become less detailed, we need relatively more data in order to
recover the primitive elements of the model.
Over the last few years various models of boundedly rational choice related to
satisficing have been proposed. We devote a section of our paper to analyze the formal
25
connections between our framework and most of those models.27
Another interesting feature of our model is that it is easy to use in applications.
Consider the following example. Assume that n ≥ 2 firms compete in order to maxi-
mize market shares and each firm produces one good and has to decide its quality. The
higher the quality of a good, the higher its production cost. Suppose that firms face a
population of ‘satisficing’ consumers. That is, each of them discovers and analyzes al-
ternatives sequentially and stops searching as soon as she identifies the first satisfactory
alternative, where each item’s positioning in the DM’s preference ranking depends on
its quality. An interesting and policy-relevant research question could be to investigate
firms’ equilibrium behavior under the assumption that firms do not know with certainty
what are consumers’ aspiration levels.
A non-trivial extension of our work could be to assume that the threshold is not
fixed, but can vary depending on the characteristics of the choice problem, such as
complexity. We leave this for future research.
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Appendix A. Relationships with Other Models
Appendix A.1. Choice from Lists
Rubinstein and Salant (2006) show that an axiom called List Independence of Ir-
relevant Alternatives is necessary and sufficient for the choice function from lists to be
28
a D,δ.28
List Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (LIIA): if x = c(A), then x = c(A \
{y}) for any y ∈ A \ {x}.
That is, assume that an alternative x is chosen. Then, removing any alternative
y , x from the list does not change the choice, ceteris paribus.
We first generalize Rubinstein and Salant (2006)’s result to menu sequences and
then show that our procedure is a special case of their model. Given a strict linear order
P and a weak order = ∪ ∼, we say that P is based on  whenever two cases occur:
(i) x  y  z implies xPz and (ii) x  y implies xPy whenever there exists an alternative
z such that either x ∼ z or y ∼ z.
Let  be a weak order on X and δ a priority indicator as defined in Rubinstein and
Salant (2006). Let P be a strict linear order on X based on . We introduce the choice
function D,P,δ, according to which the DM stops searching as soon as she identifies the
first or the last -maximal alternative in the menu sequence depending on whether the
δ-value of the -maximal set is equal to 1 or to 2, respectively. Let the set of discovered
alternatives be denoted by A j. Then, the DM selects the P-maximal alternative from
the set A j \ A j−1.
Definition 6. c is a D,P,δ whenever there exist a unique weak order , a unique
strict linear order P, and a unique priority indicator δ such that
{c(A)} ≡
 max(Am \ Am−1; P) if δ(z) = 1max(AM \ AM−1; P) if δ(z) = 2
where (i) m ≡ min{ j|A j ∩max(A;) , ∅},
(ii) M ≡ max{ j|∅ , A j ∩max(A;) , A j−1 ∩max(A;)},
28Rubinstein and Salant (2006) show that List Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is equivalent to
another axiom called Partition Independence according to which the DM chooses the same alternative from
a list independently of whether she chooses from the list or she partitions the list into two sublists, chooses
from each sublist, and finally makes a choice between the two chosen element from the sublists.
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(iii) P is based on , and
(iv) z ∈ max(A;).
Under the domain DL alternatives can be pairwise compared in two ways: either
x precedes y or y precedes x. Rubinstein and Salant (2006) define the weak order 
on these binary comparisons and use LIIA to derive their procedure. On the contrary,
under the larger domain D1 a third type of binary comparison between alternatives is
possible: x and y are discovered at the same time by the DM. We define the binary
relation P on the latter and, by using LIIA, we extend Rubinstein and Salant (2006)’s
procedure. This is the intuition at the basis of theorem 4, which states that LIIA is a
necessary and sufficient condition for c to be a D,P,δ.
Theorem 4. c is a D,P,δ if and only if c satisfies LIIA.
Notice that under the domainDL every set A j\A j−1 is a singleton and D,P,δ reduces
to D,δ.
Now we investigate the relationships between D,P,δ and our model. Consider the
following property.
Perfect Attention Position Independence (PAPI): if x = c(A) and x , c(〈{x}, X〉),
then x = c(B) for any B ∈ D1 such that A = B.
PAPI requires that if an alternative x is chosen and revealed to be unsatisfactory
at some menu sequence A, then x has to be chosen from any other menu sequence B
such that A = B. That is, if x is chosen and revealed to be unacceptable at A, then this
implies that all alternatives in A attract attention at A. Then the axiom requires that
x has to be chosen no matter what is its positioning in the sequence. It turns out that
LIIA and PAPI are logically equivalent to LCWARP and SAT, as the next proposition
illustrates.29
29In appendix A we show that LIIA and PAPI are independent.
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Proposition 14. The following statements are equivalent.
1. c satisfies LCWARP and SAT.
2. c satisfies LIIA and PAPI.
3. c is an SCF.
Rubinstein and Salant (2006) propose a procedure that includes the satisficing
heuristic as a special case. In their paper they offer the following example. Let c be a
D,δ, assume that  has two indifference classes, where the δ-value of the maximal set
is equal to 1 and the δ-value of the minimal one is equal to 2. A DM following this
procedure stops searching as soon as she identifies the first satisfactory alternative. On
the other hand, if there is no satisfactory alternative available, then she selects the last
unsatisfactory alternative in the list. Interestingly, an additional interpretation emerges
from our analysis. Assume that c is a D,δ, let δ(z) = 1 for all z ∈ X, and assume that
all indifference classes apart from the -maximal one are singletons. Set max(X;) to
be the set of satisfactory alternatives and the strict part of  to be the strict linear or-
der that ranks unsatisfactory alternatives. Moreover, rank the satisfactory alternatives
according to any ordering. It is easy to see that the resulting choice function is an SCF.
Corollary 1. Let c be an extended choice function.
1. If c is an SCF, then c is a D,δ.
2. If c is D,δ, then c is an SCF if and only if the following holds.
(a) all indifference classes apart from the -maximal one are singletons;
(b) the δ-value is equal to 1 for all alternatives in the grand set.
Appendix A.2. Relationships with Choice by Iterative Search
In Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2009) a choice problem is a pair ({x}, A), where A
is a budget set and x ∈ A a feasible contemplation point. Let  be a strict linear
order representing DM’s preferences and let Ω(x, A) ⊆ A be a consideration set map-
ping. Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2009) distinguish between context-dependent and
context-free consideration sets. The former is the most general version of their model
and implies that Ω(·) depends on both the contemplation point and the budget set in
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an arbitrary manner. The latter implies that whether an alternative is considered is in-
dependent of the other alternatives. A Choice by Iterative Search (CIS) is a choice
function c defined on DS P = {({x}, A)|A ∈ P(X) and x ∈ A} such that there exists a
strict linear order , a consideration set mapping Ω, and, for every choice problem
({x0}, A), a sequence of contemplation points (x0, x1, . . . , xn, y) such that (i) xk is the
-maximal element in Ω(xk−1, A) for k = 1, . . . , n and (ii) y = c({x0}, A) is -maximal
in both Ω(xn, A) and Ω(y, A).30
Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2009) show that CIS with context-dependent consider-
ation sets is equivalent to the following two properties.
Dominating Anchor Axiom: for any B ∈ P(X) there exists x∗ ∈ B such that
(i) x∗ = c({x∗}, A) whenever A ⊆ B
(ii) c({x∗}, A) < B \ {x∗} otherwise.
Anchor Bias Axiom: if y = c({x}, A), then y = c({y}, A).
The dominating anchor axiom requires that for every budget set A there exists an
alternatives x∗ that blocks all the other alternatives y in A \ {x∗}. That is, y cannot be
chosen whenever x∗ is the starting point. On the other hand, the anchor bias axiom
requires that if some alternative y is chosen when x is the starting point, then y has to
be chosen also when y itself is the contemplation point.
It turns out that if c is a CIS with context-dependent consideration sets, then it is
also an SCF2, but the converse is not true.31
Appendix B. Independence of the Axioms
LCWARP does not imply SAT. Let X = {x, y, z}. x = c(〈{x}, {x, y}〉), x = c(〈{x}, {x, z}〉),
x = c(〈{y}, {x, y}〉), z = c(〈{y}, {y, z}〉), z = c(〈{z}, {x, z}〉), z = c(〈{z}, {y, z}〉), x =
30Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2009) assume that c({x}, A) ∈ A is non-empty and single-valued.
31It can be shown that (i) if c is a CIS with context-free consideration sets, then c is not necessarily SCF2
and (ii) also the converse is true.
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c(〈{x}, {x, y}, X〉), x = c(〈{x}, {x, z}, X〉), x = c(〈{y}, {x, y}, X〉), z = c(〈{y}, {y, z}, X〉),
z = c(〈{z}, {x, z}, X〉), z = c(〈{z}, {y, z}, X〉), z = c(〈{x, y}, X〉), z = c(〈{x, z}, X〉), z =
c(〈{y, z}, X〉), x = c(〈{x}, X〉), z = c(〈{y}, X〉), z = c(〈{z}, X〉), x = c(〈{x, y}〉), z =
c(〈{x, z}〉), z = c(〈{y, z}〉), and z = c(〈X〉). This extended choice function satisfies
LCWARP, but violates SAT.
SAT does not imply LCWARP. Let X = {x, y, z}. x = c(〈{x}, {x, y}〉), x = c(〈{x}, {x, z}〉),
x = c(〈{y}, {x, y}〉), z = c(〈{y}, {y, z}〉), z = c(〈{z}, {x, z}〉), z = c(〈{z}, {y, z}〉), x =
c(〈{x}, {x, y}, X〉), x = c(〈{x}, {x, z}, X〉), x = c(〈{y}, {x, y}, X〉), z = c(〈{y}, {y, z}, X〉),
z = c(〈{z}, {x, z}, X〉), z = c(〈{z}, {y, z}, X〉), x = c(〈{x, y}, X〉), z = c(〈{x, z}, X〉), y =
c(〈{y, z}, X〉), x = c(〈{x}, X〉), z = c(〈{y}, X〉), z = c(〈{z}, X〉), x = c(〈{x, y}〉), z =
c(〈{x, z}〉), y = c(〈{y, z}〉), and x = c(〈X〉). This extended choice function satisfies SAT,
but violates LCWARP.
WARP does not imply MI. Let X = {x, y, z}. {x} = C({x, y, z}), {x} = C({x, y}),
{x} = C({x, z}), and {y, z} = C({y, z}). This choice correspondence satisfies WARP, but
violates MI.
MI does not imply WARP. Let X = {x, y, z}. {x} = C({x, y, z}), {y} = C({x, y}),
{x} = C({x, z}), and {y} = C({y, z}). This choice correspondence satisfies MI, but vio-
lates WARP.
LIIA does not imply PAPI. Let X = {x, y, z}. Let c be a D,P,δ and assume that
x ∼2 y  z and xPyPz. This choice function satisfies LIIA, but violates PAPI.
PAPI does not imply LIIA. Let X = {x, y, z}. Choose x at all choice problems of
cardinality 3, y at all choice problems of cardinality 2 to which y belongs, and x at the
remaining choice problems of cardinality 2. This choice function satisfies PAPI, but
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violates LIIA.
Appendix C. Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 12. Let c be an extended choice function defined onDS P.
Assume that c is an SCF2. We want to show that it is also a CIS with context-
dependent consideration sets. We first show that c satisfies the Dominating Anchor
Axiom.
Assume that x = c({x}, A). Assume first that x is satisfactory. This implies that
x = c({x}, B), independently of whether or not B is a subset of A. Next, suppose that
x is unsatisfactory. This implies that x is -maximal in A. Therefore, x = c({x}, B) for
any B ⊆ A. In addition, c({x}, B) < A \ {x}, which is the desired result.
Now we show that c satisfies also the Anchor Bias Axiom. Assume that y =
c({x}, A). Suppose first that y is satisfactory. This immediately implies that y =
c({y}, A). Next, suppose that y is unsatisfactory. This implies that y is maximal in
A, there are no satisfactory alternatives in A, and y is chosen from A independently of
its positioning. Hence, y = c({y}, A).
To see that the converse is not true, consider the following example. Assume that
x = c({y}, A), y = c({z}, B), and x ∈ B. Notice that whereas the Dominating Anchor and
the Anchor Bias Axioms are satisfied, LCWARP2 is not.
Proof of Proposition 14. We just need to show is that LCWARP and SAT are
logically equivalent to LIIA and PAPI, because we already know from theorem 1 that
LCWARP and SAT are necessary and sufficient for c to be an SCF.
Necessity. Assume that c satisfies LCWARP and SAT.
We first show that c satisfies LIIA. Let x = c(A) and let Γ(A) be the set of alternatives
that attract attention at A. Since c is an SCF, then x is -maximal in Γ(A) and, therefore,
x = c(A \ {y}) for any y ∈ Γ(A). Next, if Γ(A) ⊂ A, then x is satisfactory and removing
any y ∈ A \ Γ(A) does not affect choices. Hence, x = c(A \ {y}) also for any y ∈ A \ Γ(A).
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Now we show that c satisfies PAPI. Let x = c(A) and x , c(〈{x}, X〉). This implies
that x is unsatisfactory and all alternatives in A attract attention at A. Since c is an SCF,
then x is -maximal in A. Hence, x = c(B) for any B ∈ D1 such that B = A, which is
the desired result.
Sufficiency. Assume that c satisfies LIIA and PAPI. Suppose, by contradiction,
that c violates either LCWARP or SAT or both. We distinguish three cases.
Case (i): c satisfies SAT, but violates LCWARP. In particular, assume that x, y
attract attention at A and at B and that x = c(A) and y = c(B). Then there are two
sub-cases.
Sub-case (a): x and y are revealed to be satisfactory. This implies that necessarily
y ∈ Am(c(A),A) \Am(c(A),A)−1 and x ∈ Bm(c(B),B) \ Bm(c(B),B)−1. By repeatedly applying LIIA
to x = c(A) and y = c(B), we get x = c(〈{x, y}〉) and y = c(C), where C \ {z} = 〈{x, y}〉,
which contradicts LIIA.
Sub-case (b): either x or y or both are revealed to be unsatisfactory. Assume WLOG
x is revealed to be satisfactory and y is not. Since x = c(A) and y attracts attention at
A, then either y ∈ Am(c(A),A) \ Am(c(A),A)−1 or y ∈ Am(c(A),A)−1. Assume WLOG that y ∈
Am(c(A),A)−1. By repeatedly applying LIIA, we get x = c(〈{y}, {x, y}〉). Since y = c(B)
and y is revealed to be unsatisfactory, then, by PAPI, there exists a choice problem C
such that y ∈ C j, x ∈ C j+1 \C j, y = c(C), and C = B. By repeatedly applying LIIA, we
get y = c(〈{y}, {x, y}〉), which leads to a contradiction.
Case (ii): c satisfies LCWARP, but violates SAT. Assume that x = c(〈{x}, X〉) and
there is some A ∈ D1 such that x ∈ Am(c(A),A)−1. Let y = c(A). Since x = c(〈{x}, X〉)
and y = c(A), then, by repeatedly applying LIIA, we get x = c(〈{x}, {x, y}〉) and y =
c(〈{x}, {x, y}〉), respectively, which leads to a contradiction.
Case (iii) c violates LCWARP and SAT. A contradiction takes place from what we
proved in cases (i) and (ii).
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Appendix D. Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1. It is easy to check necessity.
Sufficiency. Assume that c satisfies LCWARP and SAT.
STEP 1: There exists a strict linear order  on X, where x  y whenever x = c(A)
and A = A1 = {x, y}.
Proof. Let x  y whenever x = c(A), where A = A1 = {x, y}. Notice that y attracts
attention at A. It is immediate to see that  is asymmetric, irreflexive, and complete.
Next, we show that  is transitive. Assume that x  y and y  z. Consider a C ∈ D1
such that C = C1 = {x, y, z}. Since C1 = C, then necessarily x, y, and z attract attention
at C. Notice that if z = c(C), then, by LCWARP, z  y, which leads to a contradiction.
Similarly, it cannot be that y = c(C). Therefore, x = c(C). Then, by LCWARP, x  z.
Hence,  is transitive. Therefore, we conclude that  is a strict linear order.
STEP 2: Let A ∈ D1 and assume that Γ(A) ⊆ A is the set of alternatives that attract
attention at A. Then, {c(A)} = max(Γ(A);).
Proof. Let A ∈ D1 and assume that Γ(A) ⊆ A is the set of alternatives that attract
attention at A. Let x = c(A). Suppose, by contradiction, that y  x for some y ∈
Γ(A) \ {x}. In this case, y = c(B), where B = B1 = {x, y}. Since x and y attract attention
at A, then, by LCWARP, x , c(A), which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, there are
no y ∈ Γ(A) \ {x} such that y  x. This implies that {c(A)} = max(Γ(A);), which is the
desired result.
STEP 3: There exists a partition (S , X \ S ) of the grand set X such that x  y for
any x ∈ S and y ∈ X \ S , where S = {x ∈ X|x = c(〈{x}, X〉)}.
Proof. Let S = {x ∈ X|x = c(〈{x}, X〉)}. Consider any A ∈ D1 such that w ∈
A∩S , ∅. Suppose, by contradiction, that y = c(A) < S and let x ∈ A∩S . Since y < S ,
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then all alternatives in A attract attention at A. By STEP 2, y  x. Next, since y < S ,
then y , c(〈{y}, X〉). Let z = c(〈{y}, X〉). Notice that y attracts attention at 〈{y}, X〉 and,
therefore, by STEP 2, z  y. Consider the menu sequence C = 〈{x, y}, {x, y, z}〉. We
first show that C is different from A. Suppose, by contradiction, that z ∈ A. Since all
alternatives in A attract attention at A, then, by STEP 2, y  z, a contradiction. Hence,
C , A.
In order to get the desired result we have to show that any choice from C leads to
a contradiction. Assume first that x = c(C). In this case, by STEP 2, x  y, which
leads to a contradiction. Next, assume y = c(C). This implies that all alternatives
attract attention at C and, therefore, by STEP 2, y  z, which leads to a contradiction.
Assume then that z = c(C). However, this violates SAT. Since {c()} cannot be empty,
then c(A) ∈ S . This implies that x  y, which is the desired result.
Let xs be the -minimal alternative in S .
STEP 4: For any A ∈ D1,
Γ(A) =
 Amin{ j|A j∩S,∅} if A ∩ S , ∅A otherwise
where Γ(A) is the set of alternatives that attract attention at A.
Proof. By STEP 2, {c(A)} = max(Γ(A);), where Γ(A) is the set of alternatives that
attract attention at A. Suppose first that A ∩ S , ∅. We have to show that Γ(A) =
Amin{ j|A j∩S,∅}. Assume first that x ∈ Γ(A). Since A ∩ S , ∅, then, by STEP 3, it must
be that c(A) ∈ S . If this is the case, then x ∈ Γ(A) implies that x ∈ Am(c(A),A). Since
c(A) ∈ S , then, by SAT, c(A) ∈ Amin{ j|A j∩S,∅}. This implies that also x ∈ Amin{ j|A j∩S,∅}.
Conversely, assume that x ∈ Amin{ j|A j∩S,∅}. Since c(A) ∈ S , then x ∈ Γ(A), as desired.
Next, we have to show that ΓA = A, whenever A∩ S = ∅. It is obvious that x ∈ Γ(A)
implies x ∈ A. Conversely, assume that x ∈ A. Since A ∩ S = ∅, then all alternatives in
A attract attention at A. Hence, x ∈ Γ(A), which is the desired result.
Therefore, we conclude that c is an SCF.
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Proof of Theorem 2. It is easy to check necessity.
Sufficiency. Assume that c satisfies LCWARP2 and SAT2. STEP 1, STEP 2, and
STEP 3 are analogous to those of Theorem 1. For this reason we omit the proof.
STEP 1: There exists a strict linear order  on X, where x  y whenever x =
c(A1, A), where A1 = {x, y} = A.
STEP 2: Let (A1, A) ∈ D2 and assume that Γ(A1,A) ⊆ A is the set of alternatives that
matter at (A1, A). Then, {c(A1, A)} = max(Γ(A1,A);).
STEP 3: There exists a partition (S , X \ S ) of the grand set X such that x  y for
any x ∈ S and y ∈ X \ S , where S = {x ∈ X|x = c({x}, X)}.
STEP 4: For any (A1, A) ∈ D2,
Γ(A1,A) =

A1 if A1 ∩ S , ∅
A¯ if (A \ A1) ∩ S , ∅ = A1 ∩ S
A otherwise
where A¯ = A1 ∪ {x ∈ A \ A1|c(A1, A)  x} ∪ {c(A1, A)} and Γ(A1,A) is the set of
alternatives that matter at (A1, A).
Proof. By STEP 2, {c(A1, A)} = max(Γ(A1),A;), where Γ(A1,A) is the set of alter-
natives that matter at (A1, A). Suppose first that A1 ∩ S , ∅. We have to show that
Γ(A1,A) = A1. Assume first that x ∈ Γ(A1,A). Since A1 ∩ S , ∅, then, by STEP 3, it must
be that c(A1, A) ∈ S . Moreover, by SAT2, c(A1, A) ∈ A1. This implies that case 2 and
case 3 of definition 4 cannot occur. Hence, only case 1 of definition 4 can occur, that
is, x ∈ A1, as desired. Conversely, assume that x ∈ A1. This immediately implies that
x ∈ Γ(A1,A).
Assume that (A \ A1) ∩ S , ∅ = A1 ∩ S . We have to show that Γ(A1,A) = A¯, where
A¯ = A1 ∪ {x ∈ A \ A1|c(A1, A)  x} ∪ {c(A1, A)}. Assume first that x ∈ Γ(A1,A). Since
(A \ A1) ∩ S , ∅ = A1 ∩ S , then, by STEP 2, c(A1, A) ∈ S , which rules out case 2 of
definition 4. This implies that x ∈ A1 (case 1) and x ∈ A \ A1 only if c(A1, A)  x (case
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3) or x = c(A1, A). Hence, x ∈ A¯. Conversely, assume that x ∈ A¯. Since, by STEP
3, it must be that c(A1, A) ∈ S , then c(A1, A) < A1. This does not rule out any case of
definition 4. Hence, x ∈ Γ(A1,A), as desired.
Finally, assume that A ∩ S = ∅. We have to show that Γ(A1,A) = A. Clearly,
x ∈ Γ(A1, A) implies x ∈ A. Conversely, assume that x ∈ A. Since A ∩ S = ∅, then
c(A) , c({c(A)}, X). This implies that x ∈ Γ(A1, A) as desired.
Therefore, we conclude that c is an SCF2.
Proof of Theorem 3. Necessity. Assume that C is an ISCC. We have to show that
C satisfies WARP and MI. We first show that it satisfies WARP.
Let x, y ∈ A ∩ B and assume that x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ C(B). We have to show that
x ∈ C(B). The fact that x ∈ C(A) and y ∈ C(B) implies that there exist two menu
sequences A,B ∈ D1 such that x = c(A) and y = c(B). Notice that it cannot be that
neither (i) both x and y are unsatisfactory, nor (ii) WLOG x is satisfactory and y is not.
To see it, notice that (i) if both x and y were unsatisfactory, then the DM would pay
attention to all alternatives at A and B. This would imply that both x  y and y  x,
a contradiction. Moreover, (ii) if WLOG x was satisfactory and y was not, then the
DM would pay attention to all alternatives at B, revealing y  x. However, this would
contradict the fact that x is satisfactory and y is not. Hence, the only possibility is that
both x and y are satisfactory. This implies that x = c(〈{x}, X〉) and y = c(〈{y}, X〉).
Let B′ be a menu sequence such that B′ = 〈{x}, . . . , B〉. By SAT, x = c(B′). Hence,
x ∈ C(B), as desired.
Now we show that C satisfies MI. Assume that x, y ∈ C(A). We have to show
that x ∈ C(X). The fact that x, y ∈ C(A) implies that there exist two menu sequences
A,A′ ∈ D1 such that x = c(A) and y = c(A′). Notice that this can happen if and
only if both x and y are satisfactory. But, if this is the case, then x = c(〈{x}, X〉) and
y = c(〈{y}, X〉), which implies that x ∈ C(X), as desired.
Sufficiency. Assume that C satisfies WARP and MI. We have to show that there
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exists an SCF such that, for any A ∈ D3,
C(A) = {x ∈ A|x = c(A) for some menu sequence A of A}
It is well-known that if C satisfies WARP, then there exists a weak order ∗ such
that C(A) = max(A;∗) for any A ∈ P(X), provided that P(X) contains all subsets of
X up to three elements. Next, notice that, by MI, indifference is admitted only among
∗-maximal alternatives. Suppose not and assume, by contradiction, that x ∼∗ y and
there is some z such that z ∗ x. Hence, there exist A, B ∈ D3 such that x, y ∈ C(A),
z ∈ C(B), and x < C(B). By MI, x ∈ C(X). Since z ∈ X, then x ∗ z, which leads to a
contradiction.
Let c be an SCF, where UC(X; xs) ≡ max(X;∗) and  is any completion of ∗.
Let Cc(A) = {x ∈ A|x = c(A) for some menu sequence A of A}. We need to show that
C(A) = Cc(A). Assume first that x ∈ C(A). This implies that x is either satisfactory or
unsatisfactory and -maximal in A. In either case x = c(〈{x}, . . . , A〉) and, therefore,
x ∈ Cc(A). Conversely, if x < C(A), then x is a dominated unsatisfactory alternative
and there is no menu sequence A such that x = c(A), which implies that x < Cc(A), as
desired.
Proof of Theorem 4. It is easy to check necessity.
Sufficiency. Assume that c satisfies LIIA. We want to show that c is a D,P,δ. By
Proposition 2 in Rubinstein and Salant (2006) there exists a weak order = ∪ ∼, such
that
• x  y whenever x = c(〈{x}, {x, y}〉) and x = c(〈{y}, {x, y}〉)
• x ∼1 y whenever x = c(〈{x}, {x, y}〉) and y = c(〈{y}, {x, y}〉)
• x ∼2 y whenever y = c(〈{x}, {x, y}〉) and x = c(〈{y}, {x, y}〉),
.
where if x ∼ y then either x ∼1 y or x ∼2 y. Moreover, every indifference set I is
characterized by the fact that its members relate to each other either by ∼1 or by ∼2.
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If all alternatives in I are related by ∼1, then let δ(x) = 1 for all x ∈ I. Otherwise, let
δ(x) = 2.
Define P as xPy whenever x = c(〈{x, y}〉). Clearly, P is irreflexive, complete, and
asymmetric. To see that it is also transitive, assume that xPy and yPz. This implies
that x = c(〈{x, y}〉) and y = c(〈{y, z}〉). Suppose, by contradiction, that zPx. If this
is the case, then z = c(〈{x, z}〉). Consider the menu sequence (〈{x, y, z}〉). Assume
that x = c(〈{x, y, z}〉). By LIIA, x = c(〈{x, z}〉), which contradicts zPx. Next, assume
y = c(〈{x, y, z}〉). By LIIA, y = c(〈{x, y}〉), which contradicts xPy. Finally, assume that
z = c(〈{x, y, z}〉). By LIIA, z = c(〈{y, z}〉), which contradicts yPz. Since c() cannot be
empty, then x  z. Hence,  is transitive and, therefore, a strict linear order.
We have to show that
{c(A)} =
 max(Am \ Am−1; P) if δ(z) = 1max(AM \ AM−1; P) if δ(z) = 2
where m = min{ j|A j ∩ max(A;) , ∅}, M = max{ j|∅ , A j ∩ max(A;) , A j−1 ∩
max(A;)}, P is based on , and z ∈ max(A;). We prove it in several steps.
STEP 1: P is based on .
Proof. Assume that x  y  z. We want to show that xPz. Consider the menu se-
quence (〈{y}, {x, y, z}〉). Assume first that y = c(〈{y}, {x, y, z}〉). By LIIA, y = c(〈{y}, {x, y}〉),
which contradicts x  y. Next, assume that z = c(〈{y}, {x, y, z}〉). By LIIA, z =
c(〈{y}, {z, y}〉), which contradicts y  z. Hence, x = c(〈{y}, {x, y, z}〉). By LIIA, x =
c(〈{x, z}〉), which implies that xPz, as desired.
Next, assume that x  y and there exists an alternative z such that either x ∼ z or
y ∼ z. We want to show that xPy. Assume first that x ∼ z and WLOG x ∼2 z. By
Proposition 2 in Rubinstein and Salant (2006), z  y. Consider the menu sequence
(〈{z}, {x, y, z}〉). Assume that z = c(〈{z}, {x, y, z}〉). By LIIA, z = c(〈{z}, {x, z}〉), which
contradicts the fact that x ∼2 z. Next, suppose that y = c(〈{z}, {x, y, z}〉). By LIIA,
y = c(〈{z}, {y, z}〉), which contradicts z  y. Hence, x = c(〈{z}, {x, y, z}〉). By LIIA,
x = c(〈{x, y}〉), which implies that xPy. Assume now that that y ∼ z and WLOG x ∼1 z.
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By Proposition 2 in Rubinstein and Salant (2006), x  z. Consider the menu sequence
(〈{z}, {x, y, z}〉). Assume that z = c(〈{z}, {x, y, z}〉). By LIIA, z = c(〈{z}, {x, z}〉), which
contradicts the fact that x  z. Next, suppose that y = c(〈{z}, {x, y, z}〉). By LIIA,
y = c(〈{z}, {y, z}〉), which contradicts the fact that y ∼1 z. Hence, x = c(〈{z}, {x, y, z}〉).
By LIIA, x = c(〈{x, y}〉), which implies that xPy, as desired.
STEP 2: c(A) ∈ A j ∩max(A;) , ∅ for some j.
Proof. Let x = c(A). Suppose, by contradiction, that x ∈ Ai, where Ai ∩ max(A;
) = ∅. This implies that there exists an alternative y ∈ A such that y ∈ A j \ Ai and y  x,
where necessarily j > i. Since x = c(A), then, by LIIA, x = c(〈{x}, {x, y}〉), which
contradicts the fact that y  x. Hence, c(A) ∈ A j such that A j ∩max(A;) , ∅.
STEP 3: Let z ∈ max(A;).
(i) If δ(z) = 1, then, c(A) ∈ Am \ Am−1 , where m = min{ j|A j ∩max(A;) , ∅}.
(ii) If δ(z) = 2, then c(A) ∈ AM \ AM−1 , where M = max{ j|∅ , A j ∩ max(A;) ,
A j−1 ∩max(A;)}.
Proof. Let x = c(A). Assume that δ(z) = 1, where z ∈ max(A;). Suppose,
by contradiction, that x < Am , where m = min{ j|A j ∩ max(A;) , ∅}. Let y ∈
Am ∩max(A;). Assume first that x ∈ Am+k \ Am, where k > 0. By STEP 2, x ∈ Am+k ∩
max(A;) , ∅. By LIIA, x = c(〈{y}, {x, y}〉). Then there are two cases. First, assume
that x ∈ max(A;). However, this contradicts the fact that y ∼1 x. Second, assume that
x < max(A;). In this case, y  x, which contradicts x = c(〈{y}, {x, y}〉). Next, assume
that x ∈ Am ∩ Am−1. By LIIA, x = c(〈{y}, {x, y}〉). It cannot be that x ∈ max(A;),
because otherwise Am−1 = Am, which is a contradiction. If x < max(A;), then y  x,
which contradicts x = c(〈{y}, {x, y}〉). Hence, x ∈ Am \ Am−1.
Part (ii) is proved in a similar way.
STEP 4: Let z ∈ max(A;).
(i) If δ(z) = 1, then {c(A)} = max(Am \ Am−1; P).
(ii) If δ(z) = 2, then {c(A)} = max(AM \ AM−1; P).
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Proof. Let x = c(A). Assume that δ(z) = 1, where z ∈ max(A;). By STEP 3,
c(A) ∈ Am \ Am−1. By LIIA, xPy for any y ∈ Am \ Am−1 \ {x}. Hence, x is P-maximal in
Am \ Am−1, which is the desired result.
Part (ii) is proved in a similar way.
The weak order , the strict linear order P, and the priority indicator δ are unique
since (, P, δ) , (′, P′, δ′) implies that D,P,δ , D′,P′,δ′ . Therefore, we conclude that
c is a D,P,δ.
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